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Abstract
The rapid growth of sharing economy platforms such as Uber and Airbnb have garnered harsh
criticism from national governments around the world. In the U.S. where these platforms
originated, legal battles across the states are still on going, but robust public demand and support
for these platforms ensure that lawmakers do not regulate them out of existence. In Europe, public
engagement has yet to reach the point in which it will seriously affect the regulatory dispositions
of lawmakers, as outlined in this paper. For this reason, it is apparent that European states are
focusing more heavily on other factors outside of consumer demand1. This paper examines the
regulatory crackdowns in Italy on ridesharing and France on home-sharing to identify the
predominant factors that are leading governments to impose tough restrictions on these companies.
By identifying unremarkable levels of public opinion, current and past political landscapes that
heavily favor traditional service providers, and differing environments for innovation, it is evident
that the leading contributors to a more regulated Europe are largely caused by the political capital
of interests groups as well as cultural and historical aspects such as long-standing protection of
taxi unions and the affinity for centralized government control, both of which, are difficult to
maintain in the presence of the sharing economy.
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Introduction
The presence of the sharing economy in traditional markets continues to spark contentious
debate. In the European context, much of this debate is centered on what constitutes the
appropriate amount and severity of regulatory measures that allow states to effectively monitor
and set boundaries on sharing platforms. Proponents of increased regulatory oversight and
restrictions argue that unfettered market interruption damages established service sectors. This
includes the undercutting of prices, labor shortages, and reduced consumer demand. As likely
expected, regulatory opponents call on government to take a step back and allow the invisible
hand to direct market entrance. European free market advocates seek to provide open access to
new platforms in order to increase competition and boost entrepreneurial opportunities to benefit
individual and federal wallets. In many European states, the argument has essentially been
decided, one way or the other. States such as Estonia and Ireland have welcomed new sharing
economy competitors into their markets, while fierce governmental opposition has developed in
Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Germany2. Regulation aside, it is estimated that the economic
size of the sharing economy in the EU alone is € 28 billion3.
The aim of this paper is to identify the factors that contribute to the substantial regulatory
differences that exist between European states. This paper poses three hypotheses. One, public
opinion of member state populations hold substantial sway over the regulatory actions of
governments. Two, differences in state regulation on ridesharing and home-sharing are due to
political concerns. Three, traditional sentiments on innovation cause slow and unsteady
integration. To examine these aims, this paper will examine two cases of government crackdown
on sharing economy platforms in Europe, ridesharing in Italy and home-sharing in France to
identify why these states opted to narrow the opportunity of market integration for these
platforms. Three factors will be examined to determine whether or not the hypotheses are
viable; public opinion, political environment, and the disruptor status of Uber and Airbnb.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The first section is a literature review introduces leading
research relevant to the topic. The second section provides background information to give
needed context to the issue being addressed and will elaborate on the three factors noted above.
The third section is the justification for the case selections chosen. The fourth section presents
the methods used to gain findings. The fifth section presents both the data and findings of the
methods used. Finally, the fifth section serves as a conclusion to the paper.
Literature Review
Current literature on the sharing economy is abundant but tends to focus heavily on whether
platforms are a positive or negative force on economies, industries, and labor chains. For the
purposes of this paper, two leading articles will be used to provide an overview of the current
state of research on European response to the sharing economy with a more holistic perspective.
The first, is the Rise of Uber and Regulating the Disruptive Innovator by Geoffrey Dudley,
David Banister, and Tim Schwanen which. The second is Regulating the European Sharing
Economy: State of Play and Challenges, by Malthe Mikkel Munkoe.
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In Dudley, Banister, and Schwanen’s work, the authors focus on the rise of Uber, but assert that
the hesitation of governments to open their markets to new competition points to a persistent
aversion to market disruptors. The same disruptive nature that gives platforms such as Uber and
Airbnb their successes, is the very same reason for their inability to effectively integrate into
markets. Governments continue to impose restrictions against new competitors to lessen the
number of consumer liabilities as well as reduce the need to reevaluate national industries4.
The second article poses the idea of a ‘patchwork Europe.’ Munkoe identifies that European
states hold vastly different regulatory standards for sharing economy platforms. His key factors
include the high importance of public safety, employee rights, and protection of established
businesses. He urges that these factors have equally contributed to the crackdown of regulation
in European countries including, Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands5.
The research of these works is fundamentally important to understanding the role of sharing
platforms in our interconnected global markets, but the image these studies create is incomplete.
This is not enough to understand the true context of the sharing economy in Europe due to
differing public sentiments, diverse political landscapes, and varying market aversion to
innovation, pointing to a clear gap in the research. This paper will offer a new evaluation that
examines the differences in regulatory response between European states to develop a more
comprehensive picture of the European environment in regard to the sharing economy.
Background
Sharing economy explained
The sharing economy has many names and even more segment facets. Whether known as the
peer-to-peer economy, collaborative economy, or gig economy its nature remains the same.
Sharing platforms offer individuals the ability to work on their own time, using their own
property to offer various services to the public. They utilize stagnant, and in some cases
depreciating assets to boost their own profitability and societal productivity. This is the
uniqueness of the sharing model. These individuals are known as independent contractors, a
separate classification from traditional employees. Contractors simply utilize platforms to offer
their services to platform users, without being bound by employment contracts. In theory, these
individuals are their own employers, determining hours, equipment, and in some cases, pay6.
One important difference between Uber and Airbnb that is important to note for the paper
moving forward, is that ride-sharing operators must work at a set rate, giving them less discretion
than an Airbnb host who can list prices at their preferred rate7. Major debate continues on
whether or not these individuals should be allowed to skirt employee classification considering
in many ways, they act in the same manner as employed individuals.
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, individuals continue to seek alternative employment
opportunities that give them greater control over their work environment. It is safe to assume that
citizens always want more choice, rather than less. From an employment perspective, allowing
sharing platforms to operate gives citizens increased access to markets they would customarily
have to receive training, obtain certification, secure a job position, and commit to set wages and
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hours to operate in. The simplicity and ease of signing up as a service provider for either use of
their car or home, bypasses the timely and costly process of entering into a new career field. On
the other hand, opponents view this ease as a direct effort to undercut the business of citizens and
companies who do work in these fields, through more traditional avenues. For ridesharing, this
means circumventing taxi licenses and, and for home-sharing bypassing hotel occupancy taxes,
housing permits, and other safety regulations. In this way, sharing platform providers have a
direct line of access to traditional market consumers without having to become accredited in the
area or abide by traditional laws8.
Factor 1: Public Opinion
The development of ride and home-sharing companies answered growing demand for newer,
better services that are geared toward the individual, not the collective. Uber allows consumers to
order a car with the click of a button to their exact location in minutes. They can see who their
driver is and their user generated ratings, view the cost of the ride before they order, and write a
review of their experience once at their destination. The app adds a level personalization that
traditional taxi companies cannot replicate. Home-sharing is much the same. The hotel industry
prides itself on maintain brand standards. When a guest stays at a Hilton in London, it is likely
that that another person staying at a Hilton in Budapest will have much the same experience. The
standardization has made the hotel industry what it is, trusted and safe for travelers. In today’s
society where guests increasingly prioritize uniqueness, individuality, and personalization,
consumers are looking for alternative experiences. Airbnb and home sharing sites offer one of a
kind stays to travelers. They embody their local surroundings and culture through style of home,
décor, and the personal touches of the rental owners all for a price that is usually much less
expensive that traditional hotel stays.
Public opinion is shaped in many ways by public demand. The more the public wants a product
or service the greater the belief is that it is a positive presence in the specific area. Government
regulation in this sense can conflict with public opinion easily. A common motive that
lawmakers cite in the regulation of industries is consumer safety, which rings true in many of the
state led initiatives in Europe to restrict sharing platform access to markets. While safety is
central to the goals of consumers, when weighed against the prioritization of increased service
and product options, consumers often choose the latter. This can pit government interests and
public interests against each other fairly easily9.
Factor 2: Political Landscape
In the European sense, the political landscape is widely diverse, but all states face similar
pressures. From labor unions to leading companies, political officials are held accountable by the
industries that dominate national industry sectors. With the European Union (EU) attempting to
integrate as many facets of policy as possible, the sharing economy is no different. The EU
readily voices its support for sharing economy integration into member states, citing more work
opportunities for EU citizens and its growing effort to make the EU a digital hub. For member
states, however, even the most EU-centric, EU involvement in national markets still receives
intense pushback. Governments, both on the left and right, continue to assure their workforce
and public populations that national industry remains in the hands of national leaders, rather than
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EU officials hundreds or thousands of miles away in Brussels10. This assertion of national
government competence leads governments to enforce sharing economy regulation that fits only
the needs of their markets own rather than the whole of Europe.
Factor 3: Industry disruptors
Like SpaceX redefining space technology research or Bitcoin upending the financial sector by
offering an alternative to traditional investing, ride and home-sharing companies are actively
redefining transportation and lodging sectors. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and other sharing platforms
hold a common status as an industry disruptor. This means they effectively steal a large share of
the consumer market held by established companies. It also means they will inevitably
experience the sharply negative consequences of holding this classification11. With it comes
sharp skepticism, primarily over perceived damages to established industries, and severe
regulatory obstacles that hinder integration into markets.
It is inevitable that government plays catch up to innovation. The old adage that innovation
leads, and government regulation follows, is truer in today’s start-up dominated global market
chain than ever before. When new technology or services are introduced to the public for
consumption and use, government’s first inclination is to regulate, but in the case of the sharing
economy, how to regulate effectively and efficiently is still being decided.
Case Selection
To further the hypotheses posed, this paper looks at severe cases of regulatory crackdown. Italy
and France were chosen for two reasons. One, tourism and travel are central economic drivers in
their economies. This creates a level of similarity between the two states, due to their fierce
protection of their tourism sectors, including transportation and hospitality. Two, they offer
opposing views on what segments of the sharing economy to regulate. Italy has focused
regulation on largely allowing Airbnb to function without too much government hinderance.
Conversely, France has imposed strict restrictions and fines on Airbnb but has been hesitant to
do the same for Uber. This is a unique paradox that provides a more comprehensive
understanding of why European states are responding so differently to such platforms.
Case 1: Italy
Italy continues to be a fierce defender of its service industries, particularly its taxi conglomerates.
Taxi services are a central segment of the Italian economy and are heavily regulated by regional
and federal governments. The number of taxis on the road, the number of taxi licenses granted
each year, annual driver fees, and consumer rates are all determined bureaucratically. This leaves
little to no room for municipal decisions to change local regulations to benefit their area. Instead,
it has been increasingly difficult for new taxi permits to be granted, effectively cutting off the
Italian population from successfully entering the taxi market. The problem remains in the lack of
municipal control. Too many taxis may affect larger cities like Milan, Florence, and Rome, but
for less populated areas, more taxis can be sustained and are needed. Due to the national nature
of this industry, this discrepancy has yet to be solved effectively. The entrance of Uber and other
ride-sharing platforms in many ways was a private sector solution to this public sector problem.
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By allowing non-licensed taxi drivers to offer their own services to transportation consumers,
areas with taxi shortages could see increased movement and a solution to unmet demand. In
larger, more overcrowded cities the benefits of ridesharing are primarily consumer centric. More
options mean lower prices, more convenient pick up locations and times, and even greater ability
to request the type and size of vehicle to accommodate specific needs. For consumers,
ridesharing integration makes transportation more personalized, but this evolution is not a big
enough gain for Italian legislators to open their markets12.
Taking note of taxi labor unions is another key element central to this discussion. Labor unions
are strong in Italy, especially those that represent the taxi industry. Union leaders have longstanding and well-established relationships with Italian legislators, making it difficult for the
interests of ride-sharing companies to find a foot hold at the legislative levels. The political
capital labor unions hold is immense, approximately 35 percent of the Italian workforce hold
membership in a labor union13. Industry health and viability is key to union member interests,
which can form strong voting blocks that influence elections. For Italian lawmakers, it appears
that the interests of established industry sectors still outweigh new economic opportunities.
Even more imminent than voting however, are workforce strikes. Italy is no stranger to
organized labor strikes. From taxi drivers, to bus and train operators, the country experiences
strikes on a fairly frequent basis. Strikes in the transportation sector are strong enough to bring
the country, and its tourism sector to a halt. With these consequences in mind, Italy’s visceral
reaction to the integration of new car service is understandable. New competition threatens the
security and longevity of an already over saturated market.
Case 2: France
Unlike Italy, France has a thriving ride-sharing sector. Uber and other platforms operate freely
throughout the country and readily compete with taxi services. Home-sharing, however, has not
been afforded the same leeway and continues to feel the brunt of French regulatory policy. The
burdensome effects of recent crackdowns can be hard to see with over 65,000 listings still
operating in Paris on Airbnb alone, but the platform and operators face a barrage of legal
requirements that can make it extremely difficult to operate lawfully. It is assumed that a number
of these listings are operating outside of the legal framework. In early 2018, France passed
legislation that implemented licensing requirements for home-listers to acquire costly permits
prior to listing their home on any rental platform. Failure to obtain a permit and post their listing
without a legal permit number or for too many days can result in hefty fines upwards of € 5,000
per infraction. This is up from a former € 450 prior to the regulatory change. In 2018, A Parisian
homeowner who has been listing her home on Airbnb since 2011, was fined over € 57,000 for
not acquiring an operating license and permit from the city14. With these restrictions in place, it
is likely that the number of listings will decrease in the months and years to come as France
further buckles down on home-sharing.
Platforms face equally tough standards and increased liability under the new provisions. For each
listing posted in Paris without the proper documentation, Airbnb can be charged € 12,500 per
illegal listing on their site. After finding roughly 1,000 improper listings on Airbnb in 2018, the
City of Paris fined the platform € 12.5 million which remains unpaid. It is important to highlight
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that as ramifications upon the platform itself tighten, officials run the risk of Airbnb pulling out
of Parisian or French markets altogether15.
France is an important case to examine due to the large market that it offers to home-sharing
platforms, but it is far from an outlier. Similar government intervention can be seen popping up
in cities throughout Europe. London, Barcelona, and Berlin are all actively attempting to rein in
home-sharing platforms operating in their cities. In Amsterdam, legislators recently reduced the
number of nights homeowners can list their homes on rental platforms to a meager 30 nights per
year, becoming one of the strictest regulations set upon listers throughout Europe16. Like France,
the fear of increasing rent and home prices, the crowding out of natives, and reshaping
communities is causing serious conversions to be had at local, regional, and federal levels about
how to limit to spread of these operators.
Methods
The three factors outlined above, public opinion, political environment, and aversion to industry
disruptors, will be applied to the cases of Italy and France to either reinforce or dispute the
hypotheses posed at the start of this paper.
To weigh public opinion, two Eurobarometer polls will be used to generate a picture of public
sentiment on the sharing economy in both countries from 2016 to 2018. These surveys focus
primarily on the presence of public demand and perceived lifestyle improvements that EU
citizens view as a consequence of sharing platforms entering traditional service markets in their
areas. Viewing these trends over time also allows us to analyze how public opinion has changed
in accordance with more or less regulation, as government reactions have developed in response
to market entrance.
Political environment will be analyzed by looking at how political parties in power are
interacting with labor groups and trade associations. These interest groups are playing a tangible
role in the creation of obstacles and hurdles that sharing economy platforms are being forced to
navigate. In many countries around the world, striking a balance between new and traditional
companies or services is a difficult task for government officials, but one that is made a priority
in order to advance economic interests and opportunities for citizens. In Italy and France,
however, we see direct government overreach to keep new service providers down, to protect the
interests of those traditional companies.
Response to market acceptance of industry disruptors is a more difficult factor to examine. This
paper will look at how Italy has received Airbnb and how France has received Uber. This will
highlight whether these companies or if there is some innate difference between ride and home
sharing that cause governments to regulate differently. To add numerical dimension, the annual
Global Competitiveness Report will be referenced to further develop the status of Italian and
French markets in regard to the sharing economy. The report focusses on the presence or absence
of key factors in countries that contribute to innovation, entrepreneurship, and a startup culture.
Analyzing both Italy and France will determine if there is a true aversion to innovation that
hinders private sector development inherent to both states, or if Uber and Airbnb present specific
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instances that call for increases regulatory attention.
Data and Findings
Public Opinion:
This section uses data gathered from two Eurobarometer surveys to provide a broad picture of
where European sentiments currently sit on the sharing economy. Figure 1 shown below offers a
general overview of whether or not citizens believe that there are tangible benefits to using
sharing platforms, from ride and home sharing to other peer created services. A massive 73
percent of survey respondents answered that they view platforms as ‘a more convenient access to
services’ indicating that European sentiments are leanings more toward a positive perception17.
Figure 1:

Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer 467, 2018

The same study conducted in 2016, Flash Eurobarometer 438, asked a similar question. Of the
7,409 respondents, 41 percent answered that collaborative economy platforms are more
conveniently organized for consumer use18. This percentage jump shows a growing awareness of
the sharing economy across Europe and as the levels of awareness grows, convenience of sharing
platforms is growing in the European mindset. This awareness, however, does not necessarily
imply that general support for the sharing is increasing. More convenience does not
automatically assume that consumers are less worried about their rights as consumers, general
safety, or unfair competition.
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To analyze the specific sentiments of the two cases in question, Figure 2 shows the responses of
citizens in each member state to the question, ‘do collaborative services offer a wider range of
services than traditional channels.’ Here, it is clear that the general perspective of the EU
population does believe sharing platforms can increase the variety of services to consumers at 56
percent. Italy and France range starkly on either end of this spectrum. Only 35 percent of
surveyed Italians see new platforms as a path to more consumer choice, while 65 percent of
French respondents do, a 30-percentage point difference. This is an evident sign that public
support does not easily point to more or less government regulation, considering both countries
in question have heavy regulation but vastly different levels of support.
Figure 2:

Figure 3 presents a more cultural snapshot, by highlighting whether or not the sharing economy
is viewed as an opportunity to engage with other people but the conclusions are much the same.
French sentiments on this factor are the highest in the EU. At 54 percent of French respondents
see the use of these platforms as a way to engage with different people. Here, we can also see
that this is barely of interest to Italian citizens. At the end of the spectrum, only 14 percent of
Italians hold this same opinion19. These numbers indicate that there is little to no concern
regarding the presence of the sharing economy in Italian sectors. The goal of platforms like
Uber, Airbnb, and others are to provide better and more convenient options to consumers.
Without consumers sharing this same need and belief, it is understandable why certain countries
so readily push these competitors out of the markets.
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Figure 3:

Another telling section of the 2018 survey noted that 44 percent of Italians responded that
alternative transportation platforms offer greater convenience than traditional services. Of
European countries surveyed, Italian at 44 percent was the second lowest of all responses20. This
could potentially be due to one of two opposing realities. One, that Italians are unable to access
ride-sharing platforms and perhaps have not experienced the convenience of calling a ride with
the click of a button. The second, is that Italians simply do not see a gap in their transportation
market that would require a new competitor such as Uber.
Overall, it is evident that Italian public opinion is consistently less favorable than EU averages
and trends toward the lowest end of all spectrums presented. France on the other hand clearly
holds strongly favorable opinions, coming in above EU averages in almost every category.
Political Landscape
The Five Star Movement continues to be very popular with young voters. The promise of
increased opportunities, economic advancement, and bolstered innovation are driving the leftwing populist party’s support. This would indicate a new commitment to introducing new
companies, such as the sharing economy into Italian markets21. In the case of Uber, this hasn’t
been the case. These officials are still as beholden to traditional labor unions, whose bodies make
up mid to older generations of voters, as previous governments. Unions in Italy, similarly to
France, are immensely powerful, and clearly more determinant than promises of MS5 to its
youth population. Italian taxi unions have pull at every level of government and have played a
central role in ensuring that Uber does not integrate into their market22.

12

In France, legislators are aiming to stem what they have coined ‘the law of the jungle.’ In their
terms, serial Airbnb hosts are acting no differently than hotels. Much of this could be attributed
to the heavy regulatory sentiments of France’s government23. It is no secret that France has
always favored a more centralized government that implements blanket regulation, rather than
opting to allow localities to enforce laws that are more suited to their own regions and areas. For
sharing economy regulation this is no different. Current Airbnb restrictions centered in Paris are
impacting all of France, reducing the ability of neighboring town populations to act as an Airbnb
host24. France also holds a long history of government intervention in industry sectors. Tough
regulation and high standards keep sectors functioning at a level of even quality, stringent price
controls, and standardized employee work requirements and wages. The threat of the sharing
economy is that the government is essentially unable to intervene in these factors. The draw of
the sharing economy is that employee wages and hours are highly flexible and largely
unimpacted by the requirements of its traditional market counterparts.
Industry Disruptors
Both Italy and France are experiencing high involvement of labor unions and industry trade
associations to oppose sharing economy platforms from encroaching on their territory. This has
similarly been the case in the U.S. but all in all, the sharing economy is functioning openly
across U.S. states, with minor to no limitations compared to those of Europe. In both Italy and in
Paris, France advertising Uber and Airbnb are respectively banned. This highlights the
unwillingness of both governments to allow consumer demand of the platforms to grow. This
begs the key question of why? France aims to be a global tech hub; which observers would
assume that sharing economy integration would be a key asset of this. Other ‘tech hubs’ such as
England and Estonia have effectively allowed the sharing economy to operate, increasing their
regions entrepreneurship and opportunities to their citizens.
To put these into perspective, this paper looks at the World Economic Forum’s Global
Competitiveness Report. This annual report analyzes 137 state economies and ranks them based
upon productivity, attractiveness to entrepreneurs, and market openness. In the 2017-2018 report,
Italy ranked a dismal 43 out of 137 countries. At first glance that may not seem too bad, but this
number comes in after notoriously slow or unwelcoming economies like Russia, the Czech
Republic, and Indonesia. For the eighth largest economy in the world, and third largest in the
Eurozone, it would be expected that Italy should welcome new opportunities at a higher rate than
it does. In the same report France comes in much lower, ranking 22 out of 13725, indicating a
healthier environment for modernization that its southern counterpart.
The report also includes a scale that scores states from 1 to 10 representing performance levels of
innovation, 1 being the least performing and 10 being the most. At a rough score of 3.4, Italy
lags behind France at a score of 4.5. This groups Italy with India, Indonesia, and Russia while
France is close behind the UK, Japan, and Germany. To put this into perspective, the U.S., has
the highest score of 6.5. This data indicates that while Italy may be struggling to gain a foothold
in innovation development, France is readily keeping up with innovation leaders26. This does not
point to any inherent aversion to market evolution or growth within France, on the contrary it is
successfully becoming a beacon for innovators and entrepreneurs alike.
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Conclusion
The start of this paper posed three hypotheses. This section will explore whether the hypotheses
are proven correct or if this paper’s findings have refuted initial assertions.
Hypothesis 1: Public opinion of member state populations hold substantial sway over the
regulatory actions of governments. As shown in the data section of this paper, public opinion in
Italy was not as supportive of ride-sharing and other sharing economy companies as most other
EU member states, including France. When considered comprehensively, looking at sentiments
on convenience, access, and benefits, the numbers instead point to high uncertainty. Italy
frequently ranked below almost every other EU state surveyed in each of the survey’s singular
categories. Italians viewed the sharing economy in a very nuanced light, rather identifying these
disruptors as purely positive or negative, or in favor of more or less regulation, it appears that the
country is relatively unconcerned with the obstacles that lie in the way of integration. The lack of
public support for the introduction of new alternative service providers, however, makes it
unlikely that ride-sharing platforms will find a foot hold with lawmakers at the national level.
This could be attributed to the level of harm the public feels due to high regulation. Unlike in
Italy, where not having access to ride-sharing platforms is merely an inconvenience, in France
citizens themselves are being fined and squeezed out of an opportunity to use their property to
increase their personal incomes. People are experiencing government regulations that strip their
ability to make independent decisions with their own property and tack on burdensome financial
fees. The regulations to come out of Paris severely impact the owners of listed homes, not just
Airbnb or other platform companies. Data in France on sharing economy sentiments
overwhelmingly trended upward, toward the higher end of all EU states. Here, public opinion is
at odds with government regulation which arguably paves the way for potential legislative
change in the future, if these interests continue to find national support.
The lack of Italian public support for the sharing economy could contribute to the ease in which
the government has been able to ban Airbnb, but in France where there is substantial support
regulations are still present. For these reasons, it is unlikely that public opinion holds any serious
pull over the actions of either the Italian or French responses to Uber and Airbnb.
Hypothesis 2: Differences in state regulation on ridesharing and home-sharing are due to
political concerns. Both Italy and France face pressures from the industry leaders that run both
the transportation and hospitality sectors of their markets. It is unclear, however, why political
opposition has come from only one of the two sectors in each country. The main factor could be
that taxi companies are simply inherent to the Italian economy. Not only do taxi organizations
hold immense sway with political officials but perhaps it is about culture. The protection of this
industry could be heavily symbolic of Italian society. The French political landscape is much
clearer to understand. Hospitality groups have played a much more active role in opposing
Airbnb by dominating the home-sharing conversation to increase public and government
opinions that home-sharing ruins neighborhoods and French culture.
Hypothesis 3: Traditional sentiments on innovation cause slow and unsteady integration. Italy’s
taxi conglomerate is a driving sector of its economy and protection of its health is key to the
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interests of Italian lawmakers. This commitment, however, is dampening Italy’s ability to
compete. Innovation is slow, entrepreneurship is sluggish, and Italy is plagued with the same
“brain drain” that many Southern European states are facing. Opening markets to accommodate
access to new technologies could jumpstart its economy and slowly start to redefine its
reputation as anti-innovation. But as the eighth largest economy in the world and fourth largest in
the EU, Italy has the potential to be a real competitor in Europe and globally if consistent effort
is put forward to do so.
France does not align with this hypothesis, showing that the hypotheses is in fact faulty. France
continues to lead in innovation and is keeping pace with other states as technologies and markets
develop. For this reason, it is clear that France’s hesitation to integrate Airbnb into its hospitality
market is not a side-effect of innovation aversion, instead it is predominantly political. It is
concerned foremost with protecting its ability to effectively regulate industries and companies,
which could explain the slight lag in innovation behind the U.S., U.K. and Germany among other
states. The presence of Airbnb has the potential to reduce France’s control over new consumer
platforms, products, and companies by setting a more open market precedent.
In sum
It is evident that public opinion has not had as much of an effect as political pressures and
historical aversion to new innovation, this last point most noticeably in Italy. In relation to the
Dudley, Banister, and Schwanen work, this paper does not conclude that the mere nature of Uber
and Airbnb as market disruptor is enough to cause government crackdown. The nuanced
environment of institutionalized industries, affinity for centralized control, and the influence of
interest groups are more likely to be contributing factors. Additionally, Munkoe’s idea of a
“patchwork Europe” does seem to be confirmed by this paper’s findings. State tendencies that
are based on a variety of factors result in a variety of legislative outcomes. Political alliances and
cultural tendencies, from the protection of taxi unions to the protection of centralized
government, are the most tangible contributing factors.
Further research could examine why labor unions and trade associations in Italy and France have
tackled ridesharing and homesharing as equally. Why have taxi unions in Italy been more
successful in opposing Uber than they have in France? Or why have French hospitality trade
associations been able to influence government enough to impose strict regulations on Airbnb
but Italian associations have not? These questions could be lent to additional research in the
future, that would increasingly help to understand the driving forces behind the struggle of the
sharing economy to gain a foothold across Europe equally. As the European Union seeks to
further unify policy cohesion across member state borders this topic is likely to receive more
attention in the future.
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